From: military-radio-guy Full-Name: Dennis R Starks To: military radio collectors#2 Fcc: Sent Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 06:40:32 Subject: Military Collector Group Post, Dec.22/97 Message-ID: <19971222.063923.11407.3.military-radio-guy@juno.com> X-Status: Forwarded X-Mailer: Juno 1.38 Military Collector Group Post, Dec.22/97 Index: Group Want's & Trade's; Notice TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART I, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD David W's Want's & Got's; HUMOR; *********************************************** Group Want's & Trade's; Notice This post wasn't sent yesterday because it's size is now to large to add even one more letter. I've abbreviated everything in it as much as possible while still allowing it to be intelligible, and this is how I managed to squeeze in the last couple additions. There are now many member items included that have not been modified in quite some time. I think the best way to proceed is for everybody to re-submit their post for the Group Want's & Trade's list, thus starting fresh. While I do now have a new internet/email server that does not have the restrictions as imposed by Juno. It uses MS email software which is not compatible with our needs. Attempts have been made to install Pegasus but as yet have been unsuccessful. When this is finally done, the size restrictions of our post will no longer be a problem, & we can start work on our internet home page. Thanks, Dennis *********************************************** TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PACIFIC; PART I, BY LTC WILLIAM L. HOWARD Technical Intelligence in WW II probably had its origins in the reports sent back from Germany by Captain Rene Studler and the military attache in Berlin, Col. Truman Smith. Filed and forgotten until the war started, they were supplemented by reports on captured material sent back to the states by then Captain George Jarrett, an ammunition advisor to the British forces in North Africa. Many of the items that he sent back were also filed and forgotten until the establishment, in 1943, of the Foreign Material Branch. As the war progressed, the need for technical information on enemy weapons increased. Special teams were formed to evacuate captured enemy material. By the end of WW II in Europe there were over 4,000 people conducting some form of technical investigation. Many were duplicating the efforts of others! Although a wealth of information was generated, much of it was too late to be of immediate importance. The situation in the Pacific at the start of the war was not very much better. When the United States was plunged into a Far Eastern war with Japan by the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, we came face to face with the fact that we knew little or nothing about that Island empire. What had Japan in the way of an Army and Navy? What about their Marianas outposts and the other Jap mandated islands? How and with what weapons would the Japanese fight? Many of these questions in the early phases of the war were unanswered. We had a war on our hands yet we were uncertain of the enemy's capabilities. Our Technical Intelligence was practically non-existent --, and we almost lost the war as a result. We found the enemy much more potent than most strategists had expected, and we paid for underestimating his strength with a series of strategic withdrawals to the south. We lost important bases for a counter offensive -- the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, Borneo, the entire group of islands to the north of New Guinea, even the northern portion of New Guinea itself. With only two American and two Australian divisions between them and a completion of the conquest of the whole Western Pacific, the Japs were finally stopped on the Yokada Trail in their drive toward the Allied base at Port Moresby. The comeback looked long and hard. Over three thousand miles of ocean with thousands of Jap-garrisoned islands lay between us and Tokyo. We now knew the enemy's capabilities and how absolutely his whole home economy had been geared to total war, but an army in retreat learns little of the enemy's material, equipment and weapons, except their terrific effect. These were among the major objectives of the Allies; to know what weapons the enemy had so that we could devise countermeasures and countertactics of our own; to exploit important discoveries for our own benefit; to win the technological race. In the earliest months of the war the United States had a mere handful of Technical Intelligence men in the Pacific Theater, dependent for training upon the Australian Army. Then Technical Intelligence was taken over by the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service sections of the united States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) under the supervision of their respective service chiefs. Their operations, beginning in a small way, culminated 3 January 1944 in the formation of a coordinated organization of the six major services, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional). The 470 technical experts administered through this company kept the Allied Forces informed of Japanese progress in arms, ammunition and equipment. They were the eyes and the ears of the army in the battle of the Pacific. As differentiated from the enemy in Europe, the Japanese fought, in many cases, on a shoestring; their tenuous supply lines, reaching to the various island groups, were generally severed before the Allied troops went into operation and backlogs of enemy supplies were consequently well depleted; surrender en masse, such as occurred in Europe, with the accompanying seizure of large stores of enemy supplies, was unknown in the war with Japan until the summer of 1945 -- when the war was over. The capture, then, of any considerable quantity of Japanese equipment was a matter of great Intelligence importance. December 1942 -- January 1944 From the opening of the Pacific War until November 1942, there was little Technical Intelligence activity in the Southwest Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.). A few small arms and some ammunition plus a few items of Chemical Warfare equipment were turned into the Ordnance and Chemical Warfare officers for examination and then forwarded by both American and Australian forces to the Australian Army for examination, test and report. No organized attempt had been made, however, to have Technical Intelligence carried into the field by a team of men skilled in collecting and analyzing captured enemy equipment. In November 1942, Training Circular No. 81 established a more closely knit control for processing captured enemy equipment of Intelligence value. The flow of material was from combat troops (there were, as yet, no Technical Intelligence teams) to service troops in the combat zone, to the theater special staff officer of the appropriate service, to the Chief of the appropriate service in the United States. Flow of informational reports was through channels from the combat troops to the S-2 or G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (AC of S) to the War Department, as well as interchangeably with the service troops handling the material. Combat personnel capturing equipment of new design sent it rearward through normal recovery channels together with accessories, ammunition, and pertinent information, each service handling its own equipment. Simultaneously, a report was rendered through channels. Maintenance and supply service personnel delivered captured equipment, with no maintenance other than the application of preservatives, direct to the Theater special staff officer of the same arm or service or to his designated establishment (such as a base shop or depot). Report was made at the same time to the G-2 of their command. Both combat and maintenance personnel recovering a new type of material of a class supplied by another service delivered it to the nearest organization of the appropriate service. Theater staff officers were responsible for preliminary expert analysis as to the characteristics of the material. Based upon this, they made preliminary deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war, as evidenced by the material, and published preliminary operators and maintenance manuals, with instructions on local modifications that could be made so that the captured equipment could be used by United Nations troops in the field. These reports, together with the captured material (half of the captured material went to the Australians, half to the United States) were then transmitted to the chief of the arm or service concerned in the United States. Complete reports were also made by the Theater staff officers to the G-2 of the Theater staff, and necessary arrangements were made when possible to exploit the enemy material when captured in large quantities. The chief of each supply arm or service in the Zone of the Interior made final analysis and deductions and prepared final operator's and maintenance manuals and visual training aids. The Theater G-2, under the provisions of this circular, it will be noted, merely transmitted information on the equipment and had no responsibility in its processing. As the battle for Buna and Gona, New Guinea, was drawing to a close in December 1942, a group of five Ordnance officers and ten enlisted men were preparing to leave the United States for the Southwest Pacific Area. These men were specialists in ammunition, small arms artillery, fire control equipment, and tracked and wheeled vehicles. Prior to their departure they were given an intensive indoctrination in Ordnance Technical Intelligence at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and at Washington, D.C. On arrival at Headquarters, United States Army Service of Supply (USASOS), Base 3, Brisbane, Australia, on 30 December 1942, Major Alan C. Johnston, ranking officer, was placed in charge of the group to set up an Ordnance Technical Intelligence organization for the Theater. The program was to operate under the technical control of the Chief Ordnance officer, USASOS, in accordance with general policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the headquarters. The detachment was broken down into three sections: The Administrative Section, besides being responsible for the general supervision of Ordnance Intelligence activities, issued reports, maintained liaison with United States and Australian Technical Intelligence organizations in other theaters, collected new data issued in the Pacific Theater on Japanese Ordnance material, and forwarded this information to the Chief of Ordnance, Washington D.C. The second section consisted of Technical Intelligence Field Teams composed of an officer and one or more enlisted men, who operated from an advance base or with a task force, division or corps. Their duties were to collect, identify, prepare preliminary reports on new items, and ship captured Japanese material to the Ordnance Analysis Section. The third Section was the Ordnance Analysis Section, located at Brisbane, Australia, which received material from field teams, analyzed and prepared reports on new items, prepared and shipped Japanese Ordnance material to United States troops in the Theater for training and to the United States for Technical investigation and training, and maintained liaison with Technical Intelligence organizations in the vicinity (such as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General Headquarters, (GHQ) SWPA, with General Staff, Intelligence, of the Australian Army at Australian Land Headquarters and with the Master General of Ordnance, in Melbourne). There was considerable flexibility in these sections and personnel were often used interchangeably, i.e., headquarters analysis section personnel went into the field and vice versa. From January until July, when part of the personnel were pulled for field work, the Ordnance analysis section reported in great detail on practically all of the material that was captured. They issued 26 complete technical reports -- one report on the 75mm AA gun, was over 50 pages long, and contained 30 photographs. Technical Intelligence personnel received training and information from the Australian Army in the early days, which was quite valuable. Capt Madigan, the Assistant O.I.C., and two enlisted men spent 19 days in Melbourne in January 1943, at the office of the Master General of Ordnance in Wesley College, looking over their complete collection of Japanese Ordnance, taking the weapons apart, studying and analyzing them. Though Technical Intelligence was never actually under the Australian Army for administration, except in the same capacity as the other United States forces were attached for early operations, the alliance and cooperation was close and was of great benefit to both armies. Later, in February 1943, when Technical Intelligence was turned over to United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). Major Johnston was appointed Technical Intelligence Officer, operating under the direct control of the Chief Ordnance Officer, USAFFE. Capt. Madigan, at that time operating out of Base "B", Oro Bay, New Guinea, took charge of all field teams; he also assumed responsibility for investigating the Japanese Ordnance material held by the Master General of Ordnance, Australian Army; and from 6 March to 11 July 1943 went on temporary duty with the 42 Chemical Laboratory Company to investigate Japanese explosives and ammunition. Whereas Ordnance Technical Intelligence personnel had been sent directly to the Pacific from the United States, the Chemical Warfare Intelligence Section was formed locally. Throughout 1942, new types of captured enemy equipment were sent to the Chemical Warfare Service Intelligence Officer, Headquarters, New Guinea Forces, Australia, who made the preliminary examination and determined its operational significance. It was then sent to Land Headquarters, Australian Army, Melbourne, (later, Advance Land Headquarters, Brisbane) for Technical Intelligence. Land Headquarters then issued the equipment to the appropriate arm or service for complete technical analysis and report. Chemical Warfare munitions were sent to either 42d Chemical Laboratory or the Victoria Munitions Supply Laboratory, Marybyrnong, Victoria, Australia. The entire channel of evacuation was Australian. This was improved somewhat in January 1943, when arrangements were made for United States Chemical Warfare Intelligence Officers to be notified of material sent back from the forward area by United States forces so that they could work with Land Headquarters, Australian Army, on the disposition of that material. There was, however, no established Chemical Warfare Intelligence organization. The work was carried on as one of the functions of the chemical laboratories under the supervision of the Technical Intelligence officer of the Chemical Warfare Section, Headquarters, USASOS. Their analysis consisted merely of examining and reporting on Japanese chemical material. It became apparent that in addition to the laboratory analysis, an organization was needed which could collect equipment and study Japanese tactics, method and preparations for chemical warfare. In February 1943, when USAFFE was activated, a Chemical Warfare Section was set up in that Headquarters with an Intelligence officer detailed to formulate plans for more comprehensive Intelligence organization. At this time there were two officers and one enlisted man in the Chemical Intelligence Section, Headquarters, USASOS: To these was added another officer, responsible for documents research and publications. In addition, three officers and three enlisted men were assigned to three field Chemical Warfare Intelligence teams working under the direction of Headquarters USAFFE in the forward areas. On 27 May 1943 the Commanding General, USASOS, was directed to "establish a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment, conveniently located in relation to the captured enemy equipment depot of the Australian Army now located in Baso Section 3". The Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service analysis sections were still separate from the depot, which was used only for shipping and receiving equipment; and still there was no Technical Intelligence by Engineers, Medical Corps, Quartermaster or Signal Corps; nevertheless, it was the first step toward coordination. At the same time, Technical Intelligence of the United States and Australia was more closely coordinated through the activation of the Joint Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board which replaced Land Headquarters in determining the final disposition of captured equipment. All material received at both the United States and Australian depots was checked by the Allied Enemy Equipment Board for disposition. The Board, consisting of two members from the United States, two from the Australian forces, and one from Allied Naval Forces, made disposition of material based on Technical training needs. This permitted both forces to obtain items which might not otherwise be available. Major Johnston was appointed as a member of this board in June 1943. During the period 16 June to 8 September 1943, CWS Intelligence Team No. 1 was sent on temporary duty to United States Advance Base, Port Moresby, New Guinea. Their mission was to establish liaison with Technical Intelligence units from United States Army Ordnance, Fifth Air Force Naval Intelligence, the Royal Australian Air Force, and Headquarters New Guinea Forces. They were to clarify the channels through which enemy material and Intelligence reports and equipment would go, and to provide that such channels were functioning properly. At the same time, the team was to be prepared to proceed to any area to investigate matters of interest to Chemical Warfare. The Buna -- Gona -- Sanananda, New Guinea operations were conducted jointly by Australian forces and by I Corps, with the 32d Division bearing the brunt of the fighting. Ordnance Technical Intelligence which had just arrived in the Theater in December had a team in the field by 18 January. Two officers and four enlisted men were sent to Port Moresby to stage for two weeks for Buna -- Gona. During the next six months they covered this entire area and shipped back much valuable Ordnance equipment to Brisbane for analysis. In June, the officers returned to Brisbane and were assigned to the analysis section. Nassau Bay: 30 June 1943 On 30 June 1943 the McKechnie Force, composed of elements of the 41st Infantry Division attached to the 5th Australian Division, landed at Nassau Bay and quickly mopped up the small enemy garrison there. An Ordnance T. I. Team came up from the Buna -- Gona area in early July so that they might be on hand before the equipment and material could be destroyed or souvenired by United States troops. As the offensive followed up the coast, the newly formed Ordnance T. I. Team continued operation with the combat troops. CWS Intelligence Team No. 3, covered the Nassau Bay operations for CWS. Air transportation from Brisbane was obtained by the team on 25 June to Port Moresby, thence across the Owen Stanley Range to Dobodura, near Oro Bay. Here the team was attached to the Chemical Section, Headquarters 41st Infantry Division, and spent two weeks going through the old battlegrounds THE WILLIAM L. HOWARD ORDNANCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM e-mail wlhoward@gte.net Telephone AC 813 585-7756 ******************************************************** David W's Want's & Got's; Hi Dennis, I'm looking: PRC-10's & accessories RT-68 & accessories VRC-19 (lo-band parts, I have the hi-band, help, etc.) I saved this VRC-19 from the land-fill... Trade goodies: Not much actually, some WWII german/french radio meters, WWII german crt's, and a various tube or two. Thanks again for all your effort on this list! 73, David, N3XRW Email, david.ward@nist.gov **************************************************** HUMOR; Beatles songs re-written for computer users/programmers ====================================== YESTERDAY Yesterday, All those backups seemed a waste of pay. Now my database has gone away. Oh I believe in yesterday. Suddenly, There's not half the files there used to be, And there's a millstone hanging over me The system crashed so suddenly. I pushed something wrong What it was I could not say. Now all my data's gone and I long for yesterday-ay-ay-ay. Yesterday, The need for back-ups seemed so far away. I knew my data was all here to stay, Now I believe in yesterday. ============================================ Eleanor Rigby ------------- Eleanor Rigby Sits at the keyboard And waits for a line on the screen Lives in a dream Waits for a signal Finding some code That will make the machine do some more. What is it for? All the lonely users, where do they all come from? All the lonely users, why does it take so long? Guru MacKenzie Typing the lines of a program that no one will run; Isn't it fun? Look at him working, Munching some chips as he waits for the code to compile; It takes a while... All the lonely users, where do they all come from? All the lonely users, why does it take so long? Eleanor Rigby Crashes the system and loses 6 hours of work; Feels like a jerk. Guru MacKenzie Wiping the crumbs off the keys as he types in the code; Nothing will load. All the lonely users, where do they all come from? All the lonely users, why does it take so long? =================================== Unix Man (Nowhere Man) -------- He's a real UNIX Man Sitting in his UNIX LAN Making all his UNIX plans For nobody. Knows the blocksize from du(1) Cares not where /dev/null goes to Isn't he a bit like you And me? UNIX Man, please listen(2) My lpd(8) is missin' UNIX Man The wo-o-o-orld is at(1) your command. He's as wise as he can be Uses lex and yacc and C UNIX Man, can you help me At all? UNIX Man, don't worry Test with time(1), don't hurry UNIX Man The new kernel boots, just like you had planned. He's a real UNIX Man Sitting in his UNIX LAN Making all his UNIX plans For nobody ... Making all his UNIX plans For nobody. ================================== Write in C ("Let it Be") ------------------------ When I find my code in tons of trouble, Friends and colleagues come to me, Speaking words of wisdom: "Write in C." As the deadline fast approaches, And bugs are all that I can see, Somewhere, someone whispers: "Write in C." Write in C, Write in C, Write in C, oh, Write in C. LOGO's dead and buried, Write in C. I used to write a lot of FORTRAN, For science it worked flawlessly. Try using it for graphics! Write in C. If you've just spent nearly 30 hours, Debugging some assembly, Soon you will be glad to Write in C. Write in C, Write in C, Write in C, yeah, Write in C. BASIC's not the answer. Write in C. Write in C, Write in C Write in C, oh, Write in C. Pascal won't quite cut it. Write in C. ========================= Something --------- Something in the way it fails, Defies the algorithm's logic! Something in the way it coredumps... I don't want to leave it now I'll fix this problem somehow Somewhere in the memory I know, A pointer's got to be corrupted. Stepping in the debugger will show me... I don't want to leave it now I'm too close to leave it now You're asking me can this code go? I don't know, I don't know... What sequence causes it to blow? I don't know, I don't know... Something in the initializing code? And all I have to do is think of it! Something in the listing will show me... I don't want to leave it now I'll fix this tonight I vow! ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: The World's 25 Shortest Books 25. "My Plan To Find The Real Killers" by OJ Simpson 24. "To All The Men I've Loved Before" by Ellen DeGeneres 23. "The Book of Virtues" by Dean Rains 22. The Difference between Reality and Dilbert 21. Human Rights Advances in China 20. "Things I Wouldn't Do for Money" by Dennis Rodman 19. Al Gore: The Wild Years 18. Amelia Earhart's Guide to the Pacific Ocean 17. America's Most Popular Lawyers 16. Career Opportunities for Liberal Arts Majors 15. Detroit - A Travel Guide 14. Different Ways to Spell "Bob" 13. Dr. Kevorkian's Collection of Motivational Speeches 12. Easy UNIX 11. Ethiopian Tips on World Dominance 10. Everything Men Know About Women 9. Everything Women Know About Men 8. French Hospitality 7. George Foreman's Big Book of Baby Names 6. "How to Sustain a Musical Career" by Art Garfunkel 5. Mike Tyson's Guide to Dating Etiquette 4. One Hundred and One Spotted Owl Recipes by the EPA 3. Staple Your Way to Success 2. The Amish Phone Directory 1. The Engineer's Guide to Fashion ----------------------------------------------------------------- When finished reading use browser back button or go to http://www.prc68.com/MCGP/MCGP.html